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Abstract
The storage of votes is a critical component of any voting
system. In traditional systems there is a high level of trans-
parency in the mechanisms used to store votes, and thus a
reasonable degree of trustworthiness in the security of the
votes in storage. This degree of transparency is much more
difficult to attain in electronic voting systems, and so the
specific mechanisms put in place to ensure the security of
stored votes require much stronger verification in order for
them to be trusted by the public. There are many desirable
properties that one could reasonably expect a vote store to
exhibit. From the point of view of security, we argue that
tamper-evident storage is one of the most important require-
ments: the changing, or deletion of already validated and
stored votes should be detectable; as should the addition of
unauthorised votes after the election is concluded. We pro-
pose the application of formal methods (in this paper, event-
B) for guaranteeing, through construction, the correctness
of a vote store with respect to the requirement for tamper-
evident storage. We illustrate the utility of our refinement-
based approach by verifying — through the application of a
reusable formal design pattern — a store design that uses a
specific PROM technology and applies a specific encoding
mechanism.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation: the e-voting problem
Computer technology has the potential to modernise the
voting process and to improve upon existing systems; but
it also introduces new concerns with respect to secrecy,
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accuracy, trust and security[8]. The debate over e-voting
is not a new one — recent use of such systems in actual
elections has led to their analysis from a number of dif-
ferent viewpoints: usability[9], trustworthiness and safety
criticality[14], transparency and openness[15], and risks
and threats[19].
The potential advantages are generally accepted, for ex-
ample: faster result tabulation, elimination of human error
which occurs in manual vote tabulation, assistance to voters
with “special” needs, defence against fraudulent practices
(e.g. with postal votes[3]), and improving the “fairness” of
count systems that incorporate “unfair” non-deterministic
procedures[23].
Despite ever-increasing uncertainty over the trustworthi-
ness of these systems — which is one of the major disadvan-
tage associated with them — many countries (particularly
in Europe[22]) have recently chosen to adopt e-voting. The
main risks that have been clearly identified seem not to con-
cern those responsible for procuring the systems. In fact, it
appears that e-voting is just one, well-publicised, example
of governments wishing to adopt new technologies[20] be-
fore the risks and benefits, as perceived by the public[10],
have been properly analysed and debated.
This paper contributes to answering two important ques-
tions: firstly, whether the public’s mistrust in the security
of e-voting systems is well-founded; and secondly, whether
formal methods have a role to play in addressing the prob-
lem of mistrust. With respect to the first aspect, Kocher
and Schneier[12] state: “The threats are real, making open-
ness and verifiability critical to election security.” As to the
second aspect, expecting the public to trust the adoption of
such new technology is only possible if they can be con-
vinced that it rests on firm trustworthy foundations. The
formal methods community have an important role to play
in this respect: the use of formal notations provides a fun-
damental foundation upon which the complexities of ever-
changing technologies can be managed[7]. We argue that
without the adoption and promotion of formal methods as
the foundations of software engineering, developing trust-
worthy e-voting systems will not necessarily guarantee that
they will be trusted.
This paper proposes that, in general, already existing for-
mal techniques can help to alleviate many of the verification
problems that the adoption of new e-voting technologies can
introduce. For the specific modelling and verification in our
study we use the event-B method[1], based on the B nota-
tion. We argue that it is unreasonable to expect the public to
trust a system (or part of a system) to behave correctly just
because it is developed using a formal method (like event-
B)1. Instead, we propose that we must first establish a set of
quality standards for reliable, re-usable, trustworthy tools
and techniques that have proven themselves in the formal
development of correct systems. Then, provided the pub-
lic are properly informed, it is not unreasonable to expect
systems built in this way to be both more trustworthy and
more trusted. The correct-by-construction approach in this
paper illustrates the type of standard process to which we
are alluding.
1.2. Formal methods and vote storage
Public opinion, arising from detailed debate of the is-
sues, would suggest that for e-voting machines to be ac-
ceptable they should be developed following best practice
with regards to the engineering of critical systems. Media
reports would also suggest that the secure storage of votes
is one of the issues that is most mistrusted by the public.
We propose the use of formal methods as a means of en-
suring that a machine securely stores votes, and we propose
to demonstrate the utility of formal methods through guar-
anteeing simple safety properties of a voting machine store.
The main property that we examine is concerned with the
need for tamper-evident storage, which addresses the risk
of unauthorised tampering of vote data after it has been cor-
rectly registered and stored. In Analysis of an electronic
voting system[13], we see that such a security weakness al-
ready exists in one of the most widely procured voting sys-
tems:
“. . . an adversary could alter election results by
modifying ballot definition files, and . . . it leaves
no evidence that an attack was ever mounted”
Here, the “adversary” is most likely to be a single insider
(election official) with access to the storage device. We ar-
gue that it is the responsibility of the storage designers to
guarantee the security of the votes stored without having to
1This is analagous to the current common situation where the public
have been asked to trust the e-voting machines because they have been
independently tested by some appropriately accredited body. Experience
now shows that such trust was misplaced.
make an assumption about the behaviour or intent of such
officials.
In order to illustrate how a guarantee could be made,
we use event-B and apply an incremental refinement ap-
proach to verifying a sequence of designs for the storage of
votes, which we prove to be correct-through-construction
with respect to the simple requirement that the vote storage
is tamper-evident.
1.3. Refinement and genericity: a formal
design pattern
>From a technological viewpoint we know that sys-
tem design has an important role in security assurance.
Mercuri[17] addresses the theme of quality in the process
of engineering security:
“By encouraging artistry and applying craftsman-
ship to our security problems, viable solutions
will emerge.”
This supports our view that one must start with a simple
model of the vote store requirements and refine that model,
during design, towards a correct implementation. For this
reason we chose a simple security requirement — that only
valid votes can be found in the vote store and that these can-
not be tampered with without detection — and start our for-
mal development from there. The use of formal methods to
guarantee that only valid votes are passed from the machine
interface to the store has already been presented[5]. The
work presented in this paper, which addresses the tamper-
evident requirement, is complementary in nature: event-B is
the common modelling language, and correctness through
construction is the common formal design approach.
As one of the long-term goals of the formal meth-
ods community is to simplify the verification process for
engineers[4, 11], we support the view that re-usable veri-
fication design patterns, similar in nature to the work by
Mehlitz and Penix[16], as a potential solution to this prob-
lem. This paper identifies a good candidate for such a re-
usable pattern, combining genericity and refinement to pro-
vide a correct-by-construction pattern (see Section 4).
2. Manchester Encoding: formalising the de-
sign of a secure vote PROM
The main design that is modelled and verified in this pa-
per is taken directly from the work by Molnar, Kohno, Sas-
try and Wagner[18]. Their proposed solution to providing
tamper-evident storage involves the application of Manch-
ester codes[21] and a write-once data PROM store. The
encoding simply represents a 0 as a 01 and a 1 as a 10.
Thus, when validating votes stored as pairs of bits there are
2 additional pair cases to be considered, where (because our
memory allows only 1s to be overwritten as 0s): 11 corre-
sponds to unwritten memory and 00 corresponds to an in-
valid memory that has been tampered with.
Before we formally specify and verify the proposed so-
lution, we briefly note that there is a real pragmatic need for
tamper-evident rather than tamper-proof writeable storage.
The tamper-proof requirement can be met only by some se-
curity mechanism ensuring authorised-only update of the
vote store. This security mechanism would probably be im-
plemented as some combination of physical constraints, to-
gether with hardware and software checks. It would most
likely involve some complex encryption technique and it is
not clear whether one could, or should, expect voters to trust
such a complex system. Contrastingly, guaranteeing the
tamper-evident requirement is a much simpler problem that
— if done well — could be both trustworthy and trusted.
Implementing storage using a write-once data store has
many obvious advantages when we consider tampering: ob-
viously, any vote that has already been written cannot be
overwritten? In fact, without a more formal model of the
store, this is not guaranteed to be true. For example, one
form of write-once storage could allow the flipping of an
initial bit state to be done once and once only. This does not
necessarily guarantee that a recorded vote cannot be over-
written as individual bits of a vote will not have been flipped
when a vote is recorded. In fact, as with all storage mech-
anisms, the (encoding) protocol used for writing informa-
tion to such a store will be the deciding factor in whether
the tampering requirements are met. Furthermore, there are
many reasonable variations of the tampering requirement.
Without a precise statement, it is not clear whether we will
be able to verify whether a given system (the store proper-
ties, together with the encoding protocol) is correct.
The key property of the encoding that we shall model is
that if any (sub)set of 1 bits in a stored codeword are flipped
to 0s then the result is no longer a valid code word. We then
wish to establish that anyone with read access to the vot-
ing store can detect an invalid memory state, where at least
one codeword is invalid, and consequently any tampering
after2 the election has been completed. The verification of
this safety property requires modelling of the write-once be-
haviour in the chosen PROM implementation (checking that
1s can be re-written as 0s but that 0s cannot be changed) in
conjunction with the encoding mechanism. It also requires
the use of a special election over bit (bit pair in PROM) to
signify that the election is over, and which must be unset
and untampered with for new votes to be recorded (other-
wise anyone with access to the voting machine could add
unauthorised votes after the election, an attack known as
2It is trivial to extend our model to dynamically detect tampering during
an election but for simplicity and conciseness we do not present details of
this variation of tamper-evidence in this paper.
ballot stuffing). We chose not to include the election-over
behaviour in the model presented in this paper.
We note that this system is not tamper proof: attackers
with write access to the vote store can still invalidate the
election by overwriting vote data. However, this attacks
would be easily identified by procedures for validating the
storage state during and after the vote.
The main advantages of doing this design formally, in
event-B, are development oriented:
• an abstract model can be easily validated as correctly
expressing the requirement,
• the actual design model can be constructed incremen-
tally through refinement of the abstraction,
• the refinement process can continue through to mod-
elling at very fine grain levels of detail that correspond
to the chosen low-level implementation architecture,
• we can more easily reason about different variations
and combinations of encodings and storage media, and
• we can analyse possible problems of integrating this
requirement with other requirements of the e-voting
system, in general, and the vote storage, in particular.
Thus, we are more likely to develop a trustworthy storage.
A secondary benefit arises when we consider the issue
of how to build public trust in our formally developed trust-
worthy system. We argue that the correct-by-construction
technique, embodied in a reusable design pattern, will be-
come more and more trusted as it is used to develop more
and more systems that prove themselves to be trustworthy.
As a consequence, using such a standard technique (and as-
sociated tools) in constructing critical systems will increase
confidence in the systems’ correctness, from both the devel-
opers and the public users.
With tool support for automatically checking our verifi-
cation proof we have another advantage: if our proof tool
is trustworthy then the design is sure to be correct provided
the property that we have established, in the initial abstract
model, is an accurate statement of the high level require-
ment. To make this transparent to the users (voters) it is
essential that an initial abstract model is easy to understand
and validate, and that they have good reason not to mistrust
our proof tool and techniques. Our design approach facili-
tates this type of openness and transparency.
3. Overview of event-B development by step-
wise refinement
3.1. Event-based modelling
Our event-driven approach [1] is based on the B notation.
It extends the methodological scope of basic concepts in or-
der to take into account the idea of formal models. Roughly
speaking, a formal model is characterized by a (finite) list
x of state variables possibly modified by a (finite) list of
events; an invariant I(x) states properties that must always
be satisfied by the variables x and maintained by the activa-
tion of the events. In the following, we briefly recall defini-
tions and principles of formal models and explain how they
can be managed by tools [2, 6].
Generalized substitutions are borrowed from the B nota-
tion. They provide a means to express changes to state vari-
able values. In its simple form, x := E(x), a generalized
substitution looks like an assignment statement. In this con-
struct, x denotes a vector built on the set of state variables
of the model, and E(x) a vector of expressions. The inter-
pretation we shall give here to this statement is not however
that of an assignment statement. We interpret it as a logical
simultaneous substitution of each variable of the vector x
by the corresponding expression of the vector E(x). There
exists a more general normal form of this, denoted by the
construct x : P (x0, x). This should be read: “x is modified
in such a way that the predicate P (x0, x) holds”, where x
denotes the new value of the vector and x0 denotes its old
value. This is clearly non-deterministic in general.
In the following, the so-called before-after predicate
BA(x, x′) describes an event as a logical predicate express-
ing the relationship linking the values of the state variables
just before (x) and just after (x′) the “execution” of event
evt3. Each event has two main parts: a guard, which is a
predicate built on the state variables, and an action, which
is a generalized substitution.
Proof obligations are produced from events in order to
state that an invariant condition I(x) is preserved. Their
general form follows immediately from the definition of the
before-after predicate, BA(x, x′), of each event:
I(x) ∧ BA(x, x′) ⇒ I(x′)
Note that it follows from the two guarded forms of the
events that this obligation is trivially discharged when the
guard of the event is false.
3.2. Model Refinement
The refinement of a formal model allows us to enrich a
model in a step-by-step approach, and is the foundation of
our correct-by-construction approach. Refinement provides
a way to strengthen invariants and to add details to a model.
It is also used to transform an abstract model into a more
concrete version by modifying the state description. This
is done by extending the list of state variables, by refining
3The prime notation, where we represent the value of a variable x, say,
after an event by x′ is a fundamental part of the modelling language and is
used throughout all the models that follow.
each abstract event into a corresponding concrete version,
and by adding new events. The abstract state variables, x,
and the concrete ones, y, are linked together by means of
a, so-called, gluing invariant J(x, y). A number of proof
obligations ensure that (1) each abstract event is correctly
refined by its corresponding concrete version, (2) each new
event refines skip, (3) no new event takes control for ever,
and (4) relative deadlock-freeness is preserved. Details of
the formulation of these proofs follows.
We suppose that an abstract model AM with variables x
and invariant I(x) is refined by a concrete model CM with
variables y and gluing invariant J(x, y). If BAA(x, x′)
and BAC(y, y′) are respectively the abstract and concrete
before-after predicates of the same event, we have to prove
the following statement, corresponding to proof obligation
(1):
I(x) ∧ J(x, y) ∧ BAC(y, y′)
⇒ ∃x′ · (BAA(x, x′) ∧ J(x′, y′))
Now, proof obligation (2) states that BA(y, y′) must re-
fine skip (x′ = x), generating the following simple state-
ment to prove (2):
I(x) ∧ J(x, y) ∧ BA(y, y′) ⇒ J(x, y′)
For the third proof obligation, we formalise the notion of
the system advancing in its execution; a standard technique
is to introduce a variant V (y) that is decreased by each new
event (to guarantee that an abstract step may occur). This
leads to the following statement to prove (3):
I(x) ∧ J(x, y) ∧ BA(y, y′) ⇒ V (y′) < V (y)
Finally, to prove that the concrete model does not intro-
duce additional deadlocks, we give formalisms for reason-
ing about the event guards in the concrete and abstract mod-
els: grds(AM) represents the disjunction of the guards of
the events of the abstract model, and grds(CM) represents
the disjunction of the guards of the events of the concrete
model. Relative deadlock freeness is now easily formalised
as the following proof obligation (4):
I(x) ∧ J(x, y) ∧ grds(AM) ⇒ grds(CM)
To review, refinement guarantees that the set of traces of
the refined model contains (modulo stuttering) the traces of
the resulting model.
4. Genericity and refinement in event-B: a for-
mal design pattern
The event-B method provides a framework for develop-
ing generic models of systems, where a problem can be de-
fined using parameters to be instantiated. Intuitively, this
means that we are able to relate the current problem to be
solved to an abstract problem solved by an already existing
generic B development (theory). Following our approcah,
in the existing generic solution we must find the mathemat-
ical framework that is common to both problems, together
with some constants which need to be instantiated. Con-
sequently, in formulating the solution to the new problem
the main work is to check that the instantiated parameters
satisfy the constraints of the generic problem theory.
4.1. Projects
The development of a fully formal generic modelling
mechanism for the B event-based method is work in
progress. In the following, we indicate how the current
framework can be used for implementing the instantiation.
The key concept is that of a validated project: a collec-
tion of models, either machine or refinement or implemen-
tation, which are completely verified through type checking
and theorem proving. For simplicity, and without loss of
generality, we assume that there is only one machine in the
current project, allowing us to focus on the re-usability of
developed models. Hence, a project G is roughly speaking
an acyclic directed graph of models related by the refine-
ment relationship: G = ({G, ..., Gn},−→).
4.2. The General Model
In the following, in order to avoid confusion among
names, we use different fonts for designating problems,
models and projects. The creation and the development
of the project G follows the event B methodology. We as-
sume that G is an existing project corresponding to a given
generic problem, denoted G. The model G (see the template
specification on the left of figure 1) is, in fact, the formal
statement of the generic problem: it incorporates relevant
aspects of the generic problem — at a high level of abstrac-
tion — in an initial model. This initial abstraction can be
thought of as defining the scope of the problem and the be-
havioural properties that require validation.
The model G provides a general framework for the
current problem; the problem is characterized by a the-
ory defined by the clauses SETS, CONSTANTS and
PROPERTIES. The unique event helps in solving the
problem by defining the problem in an abstract form: say-
ing what is required rather than how the solution is to be
implemented. Intuitively this corresponds to the problem
being viewed as pre/post-condition relation between an ini-
tial state and a final state which is arrived at after executing
the single event. Of course, refinement permits us to move
from this “magical” one-step functional view of the required
system’s behaviour to a richer multi-step view.
MODEL
G
SETS
s
CONSTANTS
c
PROPERTIES
P (s, c)
VARIABLES
x
INVARIANT
J(x)
ASSERTIONS
A(x)
INITIALISATION
S(x)
EVENTS
event = L(x)
END
MODEL
H
SETS
t
CONSTANTS
d
PROPERTIES
Q(t, d)
VARIABLES
y
INVARIANT
I(y)
ASSERTIONS
C(y)
INITIALISATION
spec_init(y)
EVENTS
spec_event = K(y)
END
Figure 1. Definition of models
The generic model G is the starting point of the devel-
opment of the project G: it solves the problem G; and the
project is formally checked by the theorem prover. Con-
stants in G can be instantiated, but proof obligations must
be established to ensure the validity of properties in the in-
stantiated model, which correspond to theorems in an in-
stantiation.
Before we introduce the instantiation and refinement
steps in our design pattern, we motivate the need for such a
pattern. In the general correct-by-construction refinement-
based development process, working with concrete mod-
els often leads to refinements generating large numbers of
proof obligations that cannot be discharged automatically.
The main goal during development is to find a good re-
finement path: a short sequence of refinement steps where
a small number of proof obligations are generated at each
step and which are discharged automatically. Finding such
a path usually requires reformulating or restructuring of in-
variants, together with changes to the degree of detail (ab-
straction) in the models, and is very challenging for non-
experts. Thus, we would like to package such expertise in a
re-usable construct, which we call a formal design pattern.
In order to manage the complexity of the refinement
path, one common approach (used by experts) is to find a
more generic representation of their initial problem where
details are hidden by constants requiring instantiation.
Then, in general, the refinement path is much simpler to es-
tablish as it requires fewer interactive proofs and leads to a
correct concrete generic solution. To prove that this generic
solution can be re-used, through instantiation, to solve the
initial concrete problem, two final steps are required. First,
one must show that the initial problem model is a correct
instantiation of the generic problem model; and secondly,
one must show that the final solution model is a correct in-
stantiation of the generic solution model.
In the best case, the generic refinement path has already
been established and can be re-used directly. In the worst
case, this path has to be developed from scratch. However,
even in this worst case, developing the path at a higher level
of abstraction (and proving 2 instantiations to be correct) is
much easier4 than developing the path at the lower level of
abstraction.
Thus, our formal design pattern is a re-usable solution to
a common design problem that can be exploited by formal
developers who are not necessarily expert. This re-use re-
quires only that the developers understand instantiation and
refinement.
4.3. Instantiation
Consider a specific problem H in project H, say. We
specify the specific requirements as a new model H (see
the template specification on the right of figure 1). In or-
der to exploit our design pattern, we wish to establish that
an instantiation of the generic project G corresponds to the
given problem H;
The instantiation of the generic project G for the generic
problem G to solve the specific problem H consists of ex-
hibiting a set term σ(t, d), defined in terms of the set t and
constant of d, and also a similar constant term γ(t, d) for in-
stantiating the constant c of G. Thus, the instantiation con-
sists of repainting G with σ(t, d) and γ(t, d) and to invoke
it as G (σ(t, d), γ(t, d)). We must also rename each vari-
able (resp. event) of G by a unique variable (resp. event) of
H5. This instantiation must resolve the specific problem H
and we propose to instantiate a development path through
the refinement of H .
4.4. Proof Obligation of an Instantiation
Now, proof obligations of any subsequent refinement as-
sume that the instantiated development solves the specific
problem H. The next refinement step captures the seman-
tics of how the specific problem H is solved in the same
way as the problem G, after a suitable instantiation. When
the instantiation is proved to be correct, we freely obtain a
complete instantiated development for the new problem H.
4We have no formal metric for the complexity of a refinement path;
however, intuitively a path is simpler if there are fewer proof obligations
that require interactive proof as they cannot be discharged automatically.
5We can assume that H and G have no common parameters: x is dif-
ferent from y and events names are different.
An instantiation requires one only to prove that the proper-
ties of the system G are theorems with respect to the prop-
erties of H . We do this in two steps:
• (1) The properties of the system G, i.e. axioms defin-
ing the theory of G, are theorems in the new theory
defined by the problem H:
Q(t, d) ⇒ P (σ(t, d), γ(t, d))
• (2) both models are solving the same problem and the
event spec_event of H is refined by the instance of the
event event of G for the problem H:
Q(t, d) ∧ P (σ(t, d), γ(t, d)) ∧ I(y) ∧ [s, c :=
σ(t, d), γ(t, d)]J(y1) ∧ y = y1 ∧ R(L)(y1, y1′)
⇒
∃y′.(I(y′) ∧ R(K)(y, y′))
Once we establish these two steps, we have a formal ver-
ification of the correctness of our concrete solution with re-
spect to the already existing generic project:
Property 1 When the given (previous) proof obligations
are proved, the new problem H is solved by the develop-
ment of the problem G, up to renaming and instantiation.
4.5. A formal design pattern
When the refinement is proved, the new problem H is
solved by the development of the problem G, upto renam-
ing and instantiation. A new project H is created from the
project G of the problem G: events are renamed, variables
are renamed, instantiations are done. Parameters are not
necessarily completely instantiated or renamed: if a param-
eter is not instantiated then it keeps properties stated in the
general model and no new proof obligation is generated.
We illustrate this formal design pattern in the following di-
agram:
H
H
G ◮ H.G
H F
G1 ⊲ H.G1
H F
⊲
H F
Gn ◮ H.Gn
H
H.Gn+1
The diagram tells us where proof obligations must be
proved: filled (triangular arrow) symbols show that new
proof obligations are generated and require proving; non-
filled symbols show that proof obligations have been gener-
ated but their proofs are inherited from the previous project
(G). Horizontal arrows represent instantiation. Vertical ar-
rows represent refinement. The proof that model H.Gn+1 is
a correct solution to the problem H is simplified by re-use
of the refinement path in project G.
5. The formal development in B
For conciseness, we choose to instantiate our formal de-
sign pattern in its simplest form, where the generic refine-
ment path is a single refinement step.
5.1. Applying the design pattern
We have two generic models (m1 is a solution to prob-
lem m0) and a specific model (MCH) which is an instan-
tiation from both generic models; then both specific model
(M0 and M1) are obtained by this instantiation. Finally,
we refine M1 to a final implementation model M2. This is
illustrated in the diagram, below:
MCH
H
m0 ◮ M0
H F
m1 ◮ M1
H
M2
In the following, we do not have space to include com-
plete code for all models and so we include snippets of B
code which illustrate the main aspects of the application of
the design pattern to the e-voting tamper-evident storage re-
quirement. (Complete code for these projects is available
from the authors on request.)
5.2. Project G
5.2.1 The generic problem model m0
The most abstract generic model must capture the essence
of the problem: a vote (v) in storage can be tampered with
(be corrupted) but we can detect this as a bad vote. Storage
that has not been tam-
pered with contains only
good votes. A bad vote
cannot be tampered with
in order for it to be
made good. This sug-
gests modelling a single
abstract corrupt event.
corrupt =̂
any v where
v ∈ good
then
good := good − {v}
bad := bad ∪ {v}
end
The invariant property specifies that good and bad are
subsets of an abstract V OTE set and that they have no el-
ements in common (so that a concrete vote cannot be both
good and bad at the same time). We note that, in order to
establish the invariant, m0 generated 5 simple proof obliga-
tions6 that were automatically discharged.
At this point, one may ask what happens when a vote that
is corrupt is corrupted again. The implicit skip operation
models the abstract event where the state of the model is
not changed. This is precisely what we require: when we
corrupt a vote that is bad we require that it stays bad. Thus,
re-corruption may appear in more concrete refinements of
m0 provided they refine skip of the abstract model m0. This
is precisely what we intend to do in our next model m1.
5.2.2 The generic problem model m1
The refinement in model m1 introduces an abstract mech-
anism for encoding votes. Constants G_C (for GoodCode)
and B_C (for BadCode) are two subsets of the set CODE.
These sets are disjoint but don’t neccessary cover the set
CODE. The constant code is a bijection between V OTES
and G_C.
The last constant chg
is a relation between
CODEs. The most
important property of
the relation chg is that
a good or bad code
can only be changed
to a bad one. In B
we specify these as
PROPERTIES of the
model.
G_C ⊆ CODE
B_C ⊆ CODE
G_C ∩ B_C = ∅
code ∈ V OTE ։֌ G_C
chg ∈ CODE ↔ CODE
chg[G_C ∪ B_C] ⊆ B_C
We refine the corrupt event to ensure that any encoded
vote that has been changed can be recognised as being bad.
Furthermore, we refine the skip event to say that if we now
allow encoded votes to be changed then a bad vote is guar-
anteed to stay bad.
corrupt =̂
any v, c, b where
v ∈ vt
c ∈ G_C
b ∈ CODE
v 7→ c ∈ Cv
c 7→ b ∈ chg
then
Cv(v) := b
end
corrupt_again =̂
any v, c, b where
v ∈ vt
c ∈ B_C
b ∈ CODE
v 7→ c ∈ Cv
c 7→ b ∈ chg
then
Cv(v) := b
end
6An example proof obligation is v ∈ good ∧ good ∩ bad = ∅ =⇒
(good − {v}) ∩ (bad ∪ {v}) = ∅.
5.2.3 m1 refines m0
There is some additional work in proving that m1 refines
m0 as we need to “glue
together” the abstract
and concrete models
using a gluing invariant.
Cv ∈ vt → G_C ∪ B_C
good = dom(Cv  G_C)
bad = dom(Cv  B_C)
To glue together the actual set of votes (vt) with the
CODE we introduce Cv. Then, the abstract variables good
and bad can be defined in the concrete model using Cv.
We note that m1 generated 11 proof obligations and
all but one were automatically discharged, with the single
remaining obligation easily discharged through interaction
with the theorem prover.
5.3. Project H
In project G we have abstracted away from how a vote is
represented. In project H we work with concrete represen-
tations of the votes (within the generic structure of project
G) by instantiating parameters of the models in G.
5.3.1 The problem to be solved — MCH
In our pattern, the new problem to be solved is expressed
by the model called MCH; which contains all specific
constants, and with identical variables and identical event
names as can be found in m0. M0 (resp. M1) is the
model m0 (resp. m1) instantiated using the new constants
of MCH and our new project is MCH. MCH is the basis
for our iterative refinement development process. The main
point of interest is that the refinement between the model
MCH and the model M0, an instance of m0, allows us to
guarantee that our specific problem MCH is solved or re-
fined by our intantiated model M0. For convenience (and
space) we present all specific constants in two steps when
presenting M0 and M1.
5.3.2 M0 refines MCH and instantiates m0
We start the development with an abstract model where a
vote is represented by k bits. In fact, the abstract V OTE set
in model m0 is replaced (instantiated) by our more concrete
V OTES:
k ∈ N
V OTES = 1..k → 0..1
We have nothing to prove to verify that this instantiation
is correct (there are no additional properties on abstract set
V OTE). The proof obligation that M0 refines MCH is
obvious (with the same abstract and concrete events) and
done automatically.
5.3.3 M1 — an intermediate design step
For this step we enrich the representation of a vote by dou-
bling the number of bits. Each bit in the original vote rep-
resentation is paired with its inverse value. For example, a
vote that was represented as 10010 will now be represented
by (10010, 01101)
inv ∈ V OTES → V OTES
∀(v, i) ·


v ∈ V OTES ∧ i ∈ 1..k
=⇒
inv(v)(i) = 1 − v(i)


CODE = V OTES × V OTES
code ∈ V OTES → CODE
∀v · (v ∈ V OTES =⇒ code(v) = v 7→ inv(v))
For the new model, we instantiate the constants of the
generic model m0: GC instantiates G_C and BC instanti-
ates B_C and chgv ∪ chgi instantiates chg.
GC and BC are specified as follows:
GC = {v 7→ w|v 7→ w ∈ CODE ∧ w = inv(v)}
BC = {c|c ∈ CODE ∧ PC(c)} − GC
Note: in the definition of BC we use a predicate over codes,
PC, that is defined to identify all “possible” codes. This predicate
is true except in the case where a pair of bits in an encoded vote
are both 1. This encoding is not possible because we allow only
bits to change from 1 to 0 (and not from 0 to 1) and because all
votes are initially coded as good codes (with pairs 01 or 10). PC
is defined as follows:
PC(c) = ∃(v, w) ·
0
B
B
B
B
@
c = v 7→ w ∧
∀i ·
0
B
B
@
i ∈ 1..k ∧
v(i) = 1
=⇒
w(i) = 0
1
C
C
A
1
C
C
C
C
A
Now we wish to specify that when a change is made to a single
bit of a vote’s representation (in either of the pair elements) then
only a bit 1 can change to the bit 0. We do this by defining chgv to
specify how the vote part of the pair can change, and chgi to spec-
ify how (symmetrically) the inverse part of the pair can change.
The specification of chgi is given below:
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
(v1 7→ w1) 7→ (v2 7→ w2) ∈ chgi
⇔
v1 = v2 ∧
∃i ·
0
B
B
B
B
@
i ∈ 1..k ∧
w1(i) = 1 ∧ w2(i) = 0 ∧
∀j ·
0
@
j ∈ 1..k ∧ i 6= j
=⇒
w1(j) = w2(j)
1
A
1
C
C
C
C
A
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
The specification of chgv is symmetrically defined.
5.4. M1 instantiates m1
We have instantiated7 our previous generic model replacing:
G_C with GC, BC with BC and chg with chgv ∪ chgi. Then
we need to prove the instantiation to be correct by establishing the
following proof obligation (from the invariant of model m1).
GC ⊆ CODE
BC ⊆ CODE
GC ∩ BC = ∅
code ∈ V OTE ։֌ GC
chgv ∪ chgi ∈ CODE ↔ CODE
(chgv ∪ chgi)[GC ∪ BC] ⊆ BC
For convenience we structure the proof based on the two sym-
metric cases, depending on whether a change is made using chgi
or chgv. To do this, we split both events corrupt and cor-
rupt_again into corruptv and corruptv_again, and corrupti and
corrupti_again.
For brevity, we give the definition of only one half of the sym-
metric pair, the chgv case:
corruptv b=
any v, c, b where
v ∈ vt
c ∈ G_C
b ∈ CODE
v 7→ c ∈ Cv
c 7→ b ∈ chgv
then
Cv(v) := b
end
corruptv_again b=
any v, c, b where
v ∈ vt
c ∈ B_C
b ∈ CODE
v 7→ c ∈ Cv
c 7→ b ∈ chgv
then
Cv(v) := b
end
We note that for this step we had 7 proof obligations (for the
instantiation), 3 of which required interactive proofs.
5.5. A final implementation model — M2
A manchester code is a sequences of 2×k bits where the oddly
ranked bits give the representation of the original k bits of an un-
encoded vote, and the even rank gives the bit-wise inverse. This is
defined by MNCH , below:
MNCH = 1..2 × k → 0..1
mcode ∈ V OTES → MNCH
∀(v, i) ·
0
B
B
@
v ∈ V OTES ∧ i ∈ 1..k
=⇒
mcode(v)(2 × i − 1) = v(i) ∧
mcode(v)(2 × i) = 1 − v(i)
1
C
C
A
We also define two constants, mv and mi, to extract a vote and
its inverse from the manchester encoded (2 × k) bits:
7In our design pattern, M1 is shown as simply an instantiation of m1.
In fact, in this paper, M1 is constructed as a refinement of the instantiation.
For the sake of brevity, we have combined a horizontal instantiation with a
vertical refinement in a single development step.
mv ∈ MNCH → V OTES
mi ∈ MNCH → V OTES
∀(c, i) ·
0
B
B
@
c ∈ MNCH ∧ i ∈ 1..k
=⇒
mv(c)(i) = c(2 × i) − 1 ∧
mi(c)(i) = c(2 × i))
1
C
C
A
5.5.1 M2 refines M1
It should be obvious that the Manchester code is a correct imple-
mentation of our requirements since it is clearly a correct imple-
mentation of M1. Intuitively, M2 refines M1 by changing the
way in which the votes are encoded. In M1 they are encoded as
a pair of bitsequences; in M2 they are single bit sequences where
the original pair values have been interleaved. For example, the
vote 101 is encoded as (101, 010) in M1 but as 100110 in M2.
In order to formally proof this, we establish that the invariant
in M1 is true in the refinement M2. In order to do this, we replace
(instantiate) Cv with Mchv.
Mchv ∈ vt → MCH
∀(v, m) ·
0
B
B
B
B
@
v ∈ vt ∧
m ∈ MNCH ∧
v 7→ m ∈ Mchv
=⇒
v 7→ (mv(m) 7→ mi(m) ∈ Cv
1
C
C
C
C
A
Then we introduce two more constants:
corruptx b=
any v, c, a where
v ∈ vt
v 7→ c ∈ Mchv
GD
a ∈ 1..2 × k
x(a)
c(a) = 1
then
Mchv(v)(a) := 0
end
corruptx_again b=
any v, c, a where
v ∈ vt
v 7→ c ∈ Mchv
¬GD
a ∈ 1..2 × k
x(a)
c(a) = 1
then
Mchv(v)(a) := 0
end
where:
GD = ∀i ·
0
@
i ∈ 1..k
=⇒
c(2 × i − 1) 6= c(2 × i)
1
A, and
v(a) = odd(a) and i(a) = even(a).
Without going into details, we note that in this step there are 15
proof obligations, 5 of which required interactive proofs as they
could not be discharged automatically by the tool.
6. Conclusions
We have argued that without the adoption and promotion of
formal methods, as the foundations of software engineering, devel-
oping trustworthy e-voting systems will not necessarily guarantee
that they will be trusted. We have demonstrated the application of
the formal methods event-B for guaranteeing, through construc-
tion, the correctness of a vote store with respect to the require-
ment for tamper-evident storage. We illustrated the utility of our
refinement-based approach by verifying — through the applica-
tion of a reusable formal design pattern — a store design that uses
a specific PROM technology and applies a specific Manchester
encoding mechanism. The formal design pattern is a reusable so-
lution to a common design problem — of how genericity can help
to structure the refinement proof process — that can be exploited
by formal developers who are not necessarily expert.
Future work is mainly concerned with maintainability and ex-
tensibility, for example:
• Strongly tamper-evident storage — The design that we
have presented in this paper guarantees that the store is
weakly tamper evident. It is said to be weak because tam-
pering can be detected once an election is complete. In fact,
with minor modifications to the design we can meet the re-
quirement for a store that is strongly tamper evident: so that
tampering can be detected during the voting process.
• Election closed bit — There is a separate requirement that
no more votes can be recorded once an election is closed.
Clearly, the implementation of this requirement will involve
some extension to the storage of votes so that the store is
protected against any further addition of votes after the vot-
ing process is terminated (known as vote stuffing). A pro-
posed design is to add an election closed bit to the store and
to check that this is not set as a guard for the writing of a
vote to the store. Of course, with our encoding mechanism
we can detect when this bit has been tampered with. How-
ever, without formal modelling it is difficult to reason about
the consequences of such a design with respect to a potential
denial of service attack where the bit is set before the election
has really terminated.
• History independent storage – The requirement that the
physical order of the votes recorded in the store cannot be
used to deduce any information about the vote of a particular
voter.
We will analyse the different structuring mechanisms in event-B
and the ways in which they can be used to extend our storage re-
quirements.
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